Part II.:     Mechanisms


As a particular example for the relationship of causality and action I will discuss mechanisms.




What is a mechanism?

An Action --> Event chain (where an Event evoked by an Action is itself seen as an Action)
transfer of activity



Machines as Mechanisms

Machines are prototyped by mechanical devices that perform spatial
motions typically leading to a spatial displacement of parts.

Of interest is the fact that there is a special language, the language of
mechanisms, which pertain to machines and which the mechanical analogy
helps understand.



Toons!





Mechanisms are described in an event language
of the type 'A evokes B'  or  'if A then B'
                ('I pull the lever, and the conveyor belt starts rolling'';
                The 'enzyme enterokynase activates enzyme trypsinogen'; etc.)



Claim:
Causality and actions (plus action transfers) are
typically undersood in terms of mechanisms
We will characterize this language more closely :
(note theory deficit, with very few recent exceptions)


Mechanisms in Theory1             Mechanisms in Theory2



For the Claim to have more weight and more interest I will show more details,
which clarify that mechanisms are very special kinds of structures, as compared
with what we are best familiar with in science (explanation), and logic.









Mechanisms as Explanations

Mechanisms as explanations (explanatory inferences) are partial .
Take the Hempel's d-n version of covering law e.g. in mechanics:

L1,L2,…Ln         Newtonian equations             (general)
C1,C2,…Cm        constraints & init. cond.        (particular)
----------------       ------------------------------       --------------
E1,E2,…Ek          resulting motion                    (actual)

By contrast, the lever-pulling etc. goes like this:     

C1,C2,…,Cm  ---->  E




Mechanisms as Inference Schemes

Enthymemes are partial inference schemes of the kind interesting here.There is a recent interest on enthymemes on their own.
Standard example:
                    Everything that lives, moves.
     (Hence)    No mountain lives.
 (supplied:      No mountain moves.)
An ethymeme is often viewed as a black box; supplying a missing premise serves to "open the box".


Use of mechanisms

Best avoided? Quite the opposite.

Narratives


The Origin of Logic

Mechanisms are intrasparent, logic is transparent? Well, not exaclty. Take categorical syllogisms again.

Major Premise
Minor Premise
Conclusion

Enthymemes transform into (valid) categorical syllogisms by suppliying a missing premise. In logic it is traditonally assumed
that complete formal structure is primary and superior to partial. Mechanims suggest a different view.
(1) Logic is viewed as a generalization of natural consequence, of which causal action and effect patterns are the basis.
(2) In this context, a complete logical structure is not superior but inferior to mechanisms.(sounds like a paradox, but:)
(3) anything can complete an enthymeme; that is, the sense of because-ness in logcal consequence is not due to what is in the box.
(4) Validy is supplied by something else: if there is a (causal, i.e. "valid") mechanism that supports the enthymeme.
(5) That is, logical consequence is based on enthymemes that are well-founded in mechanisms.


The Basis of Science

                    ultimately, everything reduces to folk knowledge (or otherwise how could we understand it?)
                    my view: theories are themselves generalizations over mechanisms (not to be detailed here)




Further Characterization of Mechanisms is Necessary