This is Lecture Nine
From
Rationalism to Materialism
The relevant part of the Syllabus is this:
Knowledge and the Mind: from Rationalism
to Materialism (an Outlook)
rediscovery of the emotional mind; cognitive mechanisms in brain theory;
the dominance of reason in Western thinking; matter and mind in biology’s
perspective;
a coming anti-Cartesian picture; organismic biology and Baconian science.
1. The Dominance of Reason and How to Get Away
(In part we touched upon this already in Lectures 1-2. with respect to the
Cartesian view)
Western thought is based on detachment, and likes to be purely "etheric"
or "intellectual".
Of all human capacities, thinking and reasoning are in the focus, and these
in isolation from the rest.
The dominant view of the mind is logical and dry (---> Goguen: The Dry and the
Wet).
Is now reason really as central as this bias would indicate?
Hardly so. Embodiment (active embodiment) and causal mental models show
otherwise.
Based on these and others, there is a growing general view that human beings
should be
viewed more integratively, as a unity.
But is this a real alternative?
For instance:
Several (mostly Eastern) philosophies exists that concentrate on human life
rather than human thought.
In some sense they concentrate on the totality of the individual in his world.
In the European tradition, existentialism and phenomenology are embracing
a quite similar idea.
In these frameworks, thought is not viewed as particularly different from
or more interesting than any other
human acrivities and capacities.
Yet, neither these Eastern philosophies nor phenomenology and co. provide
alternative routes for science.
In some cases this is obvious (they define themselves against science),
in some cases less so;
but dwelling in them means abandoning science (not alternatives
for but competitors of....)
The reason is that te impact of thes views is considered methodologically.
Methodological versus Ontological Impact
A usual argument goes like this:
"It is wrong to view the human as...";
"the human should rather be viewed as..." etc.
These recognitions (or better still, hypotheses) can be viewed in two different
ways.
methodological: we should look differently - need new concepts for
new methods
(imperative view).
ontological: we find humans to be different than expected, need new
concepts to use same methods.
(descriptive view)
The scientific alternative is to keep the scientific method, but to study
the human being as an active
organism and as part of nature, rather than something
that stands out.
This should be the closer content of naturalism. Naturalism is popular,
but often misunderstood;
too frequently its program is meant to justify, rather
than eliminate its opposite, rationalism.
2. Emotions
This is just one example for the coming unity.
(Another example is of course embodiment which we discussed in detail.)
Emotion and reason are traditionally considered as polar opposites.
In fact, emotions are tpicaly considered nonexistent in the strong sense
- in the sense we
think of them, by way of our folk concepts, as
"things".
2.1. Discursive Psychology, Cultural Psychology Disbeliefs Emotions
Standing in sharp contrast [...] is the social constructionist perspective,
which asserts that emotions are not merely individual,
but culturally diverse and culturally derived. Although this perspective
is not reported in the introductory textbooks, it has many
proponents (using slightly different foci) from diverse disciplines, including:
psychology (Harre, 1986), anthropology (Lutz, 1990),
sociology (Denzin, 1984), and women's studies (Burack, 1994).
"In Harre's view, emotions are related to the language games, local moral
orders, and social functions, which make sense
of both emotion displays and emotion talk in a given culture or sub-culture,
and can only be understood in the context of these"
Harre, Rom. 1986. The Social Construction of Emotions. Oxford: Basil
Blackwell.
Harre, Rom. 1987. "The Social Construction of Selves" In K. Yardley &
T. Honess (Eds).
Self and Identity: Psychosocial Perspectives, New
York: John Wiley & Sons.
Discursive and cultural psychology sees emotions as "psychologically equivalent
to statements" (Harre and Gillett, 1994).
2.3. But Rationality is Emotional
The old view of isolated rational and emitional capacities is now changing.
The changing hardliners
Laird, J.D. & Apostoleris, N. (1996) Emotional self-control and self-perception:
Feelings are the solution, not the problem.
In R. Harre & W.G. Parrott (Eds.) The emotions: Social,
cultural and physical dimensions. London, Sage.)
Jon Elster: Rationality and the Emotions
http://www.geocities.com/hmelberg/elster/AR96RATE.HTM
Neurological evidence
"According to the somatic marker hypothesis, large branches of thought
are pruned away by the negative emotions they evoke,
and thoughts that result in social rewards are encouraged by positive emotions.
Without emotional markers, brain-damaged
patients while away long hours in "irrational" pursuits that would provoke
strong feelings of guilt or anxiety in normal people."
"The evidence also indicates that emotions and feelings are not a dispensable
luxury. They are relevant to the maintenance of
homeostasis and participate closely in the processes of consciousness and
decision-making. "
A. Damasio (1994): Descartes' Errror, Avon Books,
New York.
"Nature appears to have built the apparatus of rationality not just on top
of the apparatus of biological regulation,
but also from it and with it." (p.128.) Failure to see this, Damasio says,
is Descartes' error.
D. Dennett on Damasio
http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/damasio.htm
Dennett continues:
As Nicholas Humphrey has pointed out (in letters to me and Damasio),
Friedrich Nietzsche saw all this long ago, and put the case with characteristic
brio, in Thus Spake Zarathustra (in the section aptly entitled "On the Despisers
of the Body"):
"Body am I, and soul"--thus speaks the child. And why should one not speak
like children? But the awakened and knowing say: body am I entirely, and
nothing else; and soul is only a word for something about the body. The body
is a great reason, a plurality with one sense, a war and a peace, a herd
and
a shepherd. An instrument of your body is also your little reason, my brother,
which you call "spirit"--a little instrument and toy of your great reason.
. . .
Behind your thoughts and feelings, my brother, there stands a mighty ruler,
an unknown sage--whose name is self. In your body he dwells; he is your body.
There is more reason in your body than in your best wisdom. [Kauffman translation,
1954, p.146]
3. Matter and Mind in Biology
"I think, therefore I am...."
René Descartes
"[L]ong before the dawn of humanity, beings were beings.
Antonio Damasio
Biology is the relevant field that amplifies Nietzsche's above words. Biology
can contribute to a new
appreciation of matter and mind and, through these, of science.
(1) Biology as Source of a Material View of Science
causality
Physics is also material but in physics
the typical research is done in a theoretical style
by contrast, in biology observation
and empiry are in the focus
observation and theory are not separate
in biology -- biology is not "theoretical" (with some exceptions)
biological observation is not contemplation
but something strongly and direclty causal -- it is the
manipulation of certain entities in order to manipulate certain others
causality plays a major role here,
it is a part of the process and not a distant correlate
causality is something that can be
circumscribed but not described -- it resides entirely in matter
individuality, context and relational
properties
several fields in biology face the
problem of irreducible heterogeneity, or (in other words) individuality
e.g. immunology - each (macro)molecule
(probably) exists in just one copy.
molecules are multifunctional and therefore
(especially in combination with individuality) context-dependent
many of the biological properties are
relational (e.g. ecological, molecular, etc properties)
i.c. & r. are notoriously difficult
to accommodate in any theory or to even describe
the biological answer is to handle
them post hoc and retro-interpretatively
the traditional view of sience as based
on representation rather than raw matter breaks down here
(2) Mind as Body - the Biological View of Cognition
(this only amplifies
earlier points)
Cognition from a
biological point of view is nothing special.
Mental functions
are bodily functions as any other.
The body has autonomy
- it is material rather than just functional.
The mind is like that
- to understand it, we need to understand how matter works.
4. Organismic Biology and the Baconian View of Science
Now here is a paradox: science is the study of matter, yet science, in its
normal mode, is only remotely material.
"Materialism" is almost like a synonym for science, yet the matter of science
is something to be represented and described,
rather than something that works on ots own, or as something
which is a deep external resource.
Science is done in the style of the Cartesian mind, in other words - and
not in the full Aristotelian sense of "physics".
To cope with the challenge from matter is to revise science - not scientific
method proper, but the style in which
the concepts are built by using the scientific method.
Biology better than anything else shows that this revision
takes place not against science or moving away from science,
but in the interest of and within "science as we know it".
Two concepts in particular are relevant here:
organismic biology -- which can express biology's concern
with matter
Baconian science -- which can express science as fundamentally
causal rather than descriptive.
Organismic Biology
Organismic biology is s German tradition from the 18-19. Century.
It is often misrepresented as something mystical - cf. elan vital etc. and
there is some truth to this
note 1 organismic
biol is not a coherent theory or teaching but a view of nature and life
it includes several elements from romanticism
and several elements of modern science
note 2 as so often with
historical concepts - their problem was not our problem; it is not
"fair" (neither is it useful) to expect
O.B. to be entirely "good" or "bad" - ie scientific or not -
by our present, more advanced standards
(which developed in part through them)
This is sensibly discussed in
Timothy Lenoir (1982), The Strategy of Life, Teleology and Mechanics in
Nineteenth Century German Biology.
Studies in the History of Modern Science, 13. Dordrecht / Boston / London:
D. Reidel Publishing Co
The key names are Blumenbach, Johannes Muller.
From the biological perspective the organism is one undivided whole. Organismic
biology is (or was) concerned
with the conceptual, methodological, and physico-chemical
consequences of this early recognition.
Organismic biology is something worth reconsidering now.
Baconian Science
Science is misconstrued as based on passive observation ("collection") of
facts and a rational analysis
based on these facts. The true nature of science has never been that; data
and theory, description and
analysis as center of science is just propaganda based on a (mis) conception
of (mostly) classical physics.
An alternative view of science is at hand; it has always been at hand, as
indeed the most often cited
(and least understood) early text on scientific method clearly says it all.
That is Bacon and the Novum Organum.
Bacon and Baconian Science
Related lecture: Kampis, G. (2002): Facets of Causation , MidSouth
Philosophy Conference, Memphis, Tenn., Feb.16.
This is the title page from Bacon's Instauratio Magna (1620)
which contains his Novum Organum ( http://www.gmu.edu/departments/fld/CLASSICS/bacon.html
)
which is a new method to replace that of Aristotle.
My summary:
science is essentially causal;
causality is a property of activity and action,
so (my conclusion):
to equate science with descriptions (or "theories" - the propositional or
"text mode" of science) is fundamentally wrong (see quote below)
The image is of a ship passing through the pillars of Hercules, which
symbolized for the ancients the limits of man's possible explorations. The
image represents the
analogy between the great voyages of discovery and the explorations leading
to the advancement of learning. In The Advancement of Learning Bacon makes
this
analogy explicit. Speaking to James I, to whom the book is dedicated, he
writes: "For why should a few received authors stand up like Hercules columns,
beyond
which there should be no sailing or discovering, since we have so bright
and benign a star as your Majesty to conduct and prosper us." The image also
forcefully
suggests that using Bacon's new method, the boundaries of ancient learning
will be passed. The Latin phrase at the bottom from the Book of Daniel means:
"Many
will pass through and knowledge will be increased."
Bacon saw himself as the inventor of a method which would kindle a light
in nature - "a light that would eventually disclose and bring into sight
all that is most
hidden and secret in the universe."
This method involved the collection of data, their judicious interpretation,
the carrying out of experiments, thus to learn the secrets of nature by organized
observation
of its regularities. Bacon's proposals had a powerful influence on the development
of science in seventeenth century Europe. Thomas Hobbes served as Bacon's
last
amunensis or secretary. Many members of the British Royal Society saw
Bacon as advocating the kind of enquiry conducted by that society.
Last Words
(not that they are particularly necessary or useful)
This series of lectures presented a methodology of human cognition; insofar
as knowledge depends on cognition, it
presented a methodology of human knowledge.
The essential view communicated in these lectures is that of a causal, material
mind resinding inseparably in a causal material body,
which operates actively in a space-time environment; these activities are
organized in episodes; cognitive structures exist in order to
support and express this activity; mental entities are models that can internally
generate episodes.
The emerging conception of the human mind as something material gives an
opportunity to rethink sevaral other issues,
among them, the research style of science where causality and materialism
need more emphasis.
Copyright 2002 George Kampis and JAIST