担当: 李　娟 (D1) (短期留学生)
日時: 12/11（月）15:30-
場所: コラボ2
Title: Is compensatory punishment more efficient to promote group cooperation? A game experiment

Abstract:
Social dilemmas have always been a challenge and punishment is an effective solution for promoting cooperation. We introduce compensatory punishment as a new mechanism, wherein aside from the pure cooperators and defector, there exists the punishers who will punish defectors at a cost and will retrieve part of payoffs, that is caused by the punisher’s cooperation, from defectors. The simulation results show that the compensatory punishment mechanism can enhance cooperation more efficiently than the pool-punishment. In terms of promoting cooperation, the synergy factor r and the compensation rate β are alternative. Adjusting β is more convenient and feasible in society.

Speaker: LI Juan (D1)
Date & Hour: 11th Dec. (Mon.) 15:30-
Place: Collaboration Room 2